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Abstract This paper explores the reasons why regional economics and poli-
cymaking do not focus on the regional balance of payments, although relevant
imbalances – comparing with countries – may arise. The main purpose of the
paper is, on one hand, to gauge the importance of these external imbalances
in regional economies, with that concept being confined to the trade (goods
and services) account. Notwithstanding the limited data available, empirical
evidence for EU regions is put forward to supporting the idea that regions meet
more frequently trade imbalances of relevant size than those faced by coun-
tries. Discussion centers as well on why regions can run wider trade deficits than
nations and it is argued that as regions avoid sustainability constraints they may
even benefit from those imbalances.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to gauge the importance of external imbalances
in regional economies comparing with countries. The concept of external
imbalance however confines here to the trade (goods and services) account,
partly due to the lack of suitable data for regions, for extending the analysis
to other levels of external payments. Even for trade – namely for interregional
trade – official data are rarely available, preventing a direct assessment of trade
disequilibrium. As a result, the great majority of literature is compelled to fo-
cus on indirect measures of the external imbalances such as the gaps between
regional savings and the regional investment.
Bayoumi andRose (1993), Dekle (1996), Helliwell andMcKitrick (1999) and
Decressin and Disyatat (2000), that fit into a well known issue of economic the-
ory, the Feldstein-Horioka (FH) puzzle,1 are representative of that approach.2
Showing that regional investment and regional domestic savings can diverge
sharply, when at the national level those variables are highly correlated, those
papers conclude, in fact, that external imbalances may happen more often and
in a large scale at the regional level than among countries. Indeed, regionsmatch
the gap between these two variables resorting to external savings that flow into
the region through the external disequilibrium. These analyses, however, rely
as rule on a simplified procedure that reduces the concept of regional domestic
savings (S) to:
S = GDP − C
whereC is the private (households and non-profit institutions) and public (gen-
eral government) consumption on the regions. By the basic macroeconomic
identity:
GDP = C + I + X − M (1)
where I is the investment, andX andM the goods and services regional exports
and imports, they easily get:
S − I = (GDP − C) − I = X − M = TB
1 As is designated the extended debate following Feldstein and Horioka (1980). For a general
overview on this controversy, please address Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), pp. 161–164 and Coakley
et al. (1998).
2 Direct estimates of regional trade imbalances can be found as well in Sargento and Ramos
(2003), who concluded for the Portuguese regions that those imbalances could exceed 20% of
regional GDP, a score that as a rule would not be sustainable for countries.
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that being the reason why the focus is directed to the trade balance (TB) fore-
going the current account (CA).3
Before proceeding with the main design of this paper, that consists of the
comparison of the external disequilibria at the regional and national levels
(by an approach that does not require data availability on regional savings,
although focusing on trade balance as well), we briefly address, in Sect. 2, the
theoretical question of why regions are different from countries registering
wider external (current and, of course, trade) imbalances. There we argue that
countries face sustainability constraints that as a rule, although having different
impact in different kind of countries, limit them from running important deficits.
However for regions we enumerate several reasons why they can avoid those
constraints and are then allowed to enjoy benign imbalances, seeming not to
cause serious trouble, rather benefiting the regional economies. We then come
after, in Sect. 3, to presenting the basic idea of our empirical test for comparing
regional and national trade imbalances, which consists on the decomposition
of the cross-sectional variance of GDP growth within several spatial instances:
the OECD countries, the 15 European Union (EU) countries that were already
members before the 2004 enlargement, and the EU regions. At the regional
level, where we had data only on investment rates up to 162 regions, we focus
on the contribution of these rates fluctuations to that variance that we found to
be consistent with our claim of relevant regional trade disequilibria. This con-
clusion is solely based on investment data, rather than on savings information.
Section 4 encloses our results and Sect. 5 concludes.
2 How can regions stand for larger external imbalances?
The standard view in the economic literature, even at the countries level –
namely of the so-called intertemporal trade theory4 – is not that external imbal-
ances hit economic efficiency, rather theymay instead improve it. The argument
is that some countries or regions, running external imbalances, can avoid sharp
contractions on their consumption and/or investment, when a temporary short-
fall occurs in their production, while other countries or regions with ample
savings can use this channel for directing their excessive thrift outside the local
(national or regional) economy.
3 The National Accounts adopts a broader concept of domestic savings SN = NDI − C with
NDI = GDP+FI+NT, NDI being the National Disposable Income, FI the net factor income bal-
ance and NT the balance of net current transfers (these latter balances are not available, as a rule,
at the regional level). Following the national concept SN − I = [(GDP + FI + NT) − C]− I = CA.
For the sake of consistency, however, comparing an investment/savings gap at the regional and
countries level requires an equivalent concept of savings on both. Armstrong et al. (1996) agree
with this caution, defining savings for EU members in such a way which compares with the one
used by Bayoumi and Rose (1993) for British regions.
4 See for instance Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), chapters 1–3, for an extended overview of this
theory. An alternative presentation of the external accounts models and of the imbalance issue may
be found in Knight and Scacciavillani (1998).
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The problem with this efficiency approach is however that it ignores the sus-
tainability issue. In fact, the foreigner agents underwriting the external imbal-
ance bear a risk of loosing their capital. The point is then how prone those
agents are to finance permanent and sometimes increasing deficits on exter-
nal payments. This is a relevant issue, however, at the countries level, not for
regions. In fact, we may find several reasons why the sustainability constraint
does no apply to regions, or at least it is not so pressingly for them as it is for
countries.5 At the current account level these reasons are:
– The existence of multiregional firms, that account for a considerable share
of the regional economies, whose plants operating inside the regions are not
very often independent legal entities, and so are not liable alone by their
debt (on the theoretical ground a regional budget constraint should result
from adding up the individual budget constraints of resident agents; but
when some relevant agents are not legal entities, they do not face budget
constraints from their own, and so that aggregated regional budget con-
straint does not exist);
– The multiregional nature of the financial system as well and of the great
majority of the units belonging to it; in fact, in the international environ-
ment, households and corporations’ foreign debt is seldom handled directly,
but it is very often intermediated by the national financial system, that incurs
the liability itself in the international markets; country risk is then to a great
extent its financial system breakdown risk; for regions, however, the role
of the financial system is quite different, as financial institutions usually
operate all over the country, and they do not concentrate in their regional
branches the risk deriving from their local customers;
– The lower legal capacity of regional and local governments that prevents
the generation of a high sovereign-type risk at the regional level; regional
and local governments are not immune from national laws and they have
no capacity to protect private agents when they default;
– The supposed non-existence of reputational externalities6 at the regional
scale (at the countries level these externalities may determine the credit
rationing of some borrowers, that otherwise would be considered sound,
but that are affected by the “country risk” when other borrowers default);
on the contrary, it may happen that some regions benefit from the national
5 We have only found one paper that clearly asserts that the external imbalance sustainability
does matter for regions: Thirlwall (1980). The main proposition in this article is that “no country
or region (for very long) can grow faster than its balance-of-payments growth rate unless it can
continually “finance” a rate of growth of imports in excess of the rate of growth of exports” (p. 421;
italics ours). This above safeguard in italics really means that the non-existence of capital inflows is
assumed rather than proofed. Thirlwall andHussain (1982), a later paper that in fact only deals with
countries, released explicitly that assumption, allowing for a current account deficit. The debate on
the above proposition that would be known in literature by Thirlwall’s Law (or the 45-degrees rule
in Krugman 1989, designation), would proceed exclusively, as far as we know, at countries level,
without any appeal to the regional peculiarity.
6 For a discussion on this concept and its relevance for external disequilibrium, please address
Catte (1998).
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solidarity of other regions, through an investment bias towards the regions
of the very same country that is preferred to investing abroad.
– At finally, obviously regions do not have their own currency, and so there
is not an exchange market and risk; (however several countries in Europe
renounced, like regions, to their own currencies and are now sharing the
Euro; interestingly, that that does not seem to have relieved national gov-
ernments of worrying about their external deficits).
On the other hand, even when the current account is well balanced we may
still find significant and sustainable disequilibria at the regional trade balance
because:
− Some regions benefit of huge interregional (explicit or implicit) govern-
mental transfers7 that substitute exports financing the net imports;
− Multiregional and sometimes even local corporations grant a large inter-
regional income redistribution, paying dividends to their shareholders or
interests to their lenders, sometimes residing outside of the region, or paying
wages to employees living in neighboring regions.
For all these reasons, we do believe that the sustainability issue does not
apply for regional deficits,8 in contrast to the efficiency approach that in our
opinion remains valid. By the same token, capital mobility promotes economic
efficiency, even if it induces important current and trade deficits, allowing inves-
tors to search for more profitable locations besides savings locations. In the
remaining part of this paper, we then look for some empirical proof on higher
frequency of sizeable imbalances for regions, given this argument of the irrele-
vance of sustainability at the regional level.
3 Empirical evidence on trade imbalances: a test on spatial “risk sharing”
The purpose of the following sections is to provide empirical evidence that
trade imbalances happen more often with a considerable dimension, for EU
regions, than they arise either for OECD countries or the 15 EU countries that
were members before the May 2004 enlargement (EU15). As a matter of fact,
our prior expectation is that the EU15 may lie in some kind of an intermedi-
ate position between regional sharp trade imbalances and the more balanced
regime typical of countries (here represented by the OECD members).
The basic idea of our test, that proceeds from Asdrubali et al. (1996) and
Sorensen and Yosha (1998), is that economic agents – either at national or
7 Eurostat has promoted in several European countries pilot studies on general government re-
gional accounts, with the aim of gauging this kind of transfers, whether they are explicit or merely
implicit. For a description of this experience see Ramos (2000).
8 As a matter of fact we may acquiesce that this statement may depend on what we mean by
regions. A very large region or a group of regions looks probably more “like a country” than “like
a region” in many aspects. Large regions may then be more “financed-constrained”, like countries,
because reputational externalities develop, multiregional firms are not so prevalent, or there is a
sizable regional financial system. In this paper, regions are to be seen as small ones, as the European
regions (NUTS II) considered in the sections ahead.
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regional level – search for a smooth distribution of the private and public con-
sumptionC over space (as they do over time as well). VariableC should then (to
some extent) be immune from idiosyncratic shocks in the level of production of
the very country or region we are examining. This behavior, that those authors
designated as “risk sharing”, consists of the attempt to stabilize the fraction kit
defined as:
kit =
Cit
Cwt
where i is the lower-level space, the country for a cross-country analysis or the
region for the regional approach, and w the high-level space, the world in the
former case or the country in the regional one. In case of full risk sharing, kit
becomes a constant, not depending on t (neither on the lower-level space GDP
hypothetically hit by idiosyncratic disturbance).
Our proposal, similar to the one of Asdrubali et al. (1996) and Sorensen and
Yosha (1998), is then to proceed to the decomposition of the cross-sectional
variance of shocks to GDP, here based on the identity ahead (please note that
by (1): GDP − I = TB + C):
GDP ≡ GDP
GDP − I ·
TB + C
C
· C (2)
Following those authors we easily reach:
var(GDPgr) = var( logGDP)
= cov[ logGDP −  log(GDP − I), logGDP]
+cov[ log(TB + C) −  logC, logGDP]
+cov( logC, logGDP)
Dividing both sides of the equality by the cross-sectional variance of the GDP
growth rate var (GDPgr), we get:
1 = β1 + β2 + β3 (3)
where β1,β2 and β3, that are the shares in the decomposition of the variance
of GDPgr, coincide with the slopes obtained by the OLS of the regressions of
logGDP − log(GDP − I),log(TB + C) − logC, and logC on GDPgr.
Clearly, if there is full risk sharing, and therefore specific product disturbance
does not spread at all into consumption, then cov(logC,logGDP) = 0 and
β3 = 0.When, on the other hand, β3 = 0, consumption fluctuations are not fully
exempted from idiosyncratic impacts onGDP, and 1−β3 is to be regarded as the
risk sharing degree among a conglomerate of (national or regional) economies.
If full or partial risk sharing does exist within a set of economies (0 ≤ β3 < 1),
then by (3) either β1 or β2 or both are positive.When β1 is positive, we conclude
Does the trade balance really matter for regions? 235
that consumption stabilizing has been reached at the expense of investment.
This happens because the investment rate (I/GDP) declines during recession
or weak growth periods, but booms when production increase, making the most
of positive temporary product shocks not affecting consumption.
When we have β2 significantly positive, we may then assert that the risk
sharing stabilizer mechanism is feed by external savings (measured in a broad
sense by −TB). The implication is that when the economy slows, economic
agents lay their hands on the external savings to protect their consumption
path, and also eventually for keeping their investment up (if β1 ∼= 0 at the same
time). On the other hand, when the economy grows faster than their partners,
β2 > 0 means that dependence on external savings lessens, or even that the
economy exports excessive savings through a superavit TB > 0.β1 and β2 are of
course the shares assigned to each one of these mechanisms in the risk sharing
process.
In fact, at the country level (OECD and EU15), unlike regions, we went
further decomposing β2– the contribution of external savings (gauged by −TB)
to the smoothing mechanism – as follows:
TB + C
C
≡ TB + C−NT − FI + C
−NT − FI + C
−FI + C
−FI + C
C
(4)
implying:
β2 = β21 + β22 + β23 (5)
where β21,β22 and β23 are the slopes of the OLS regressions of the growth rates
of the parts in (4) above on GDPgr. β21 represents the contribution of the strict
National Accounts measure of external savings, generated through the current
account deficit –CA, to the risk sharing process (please take into account that
CA is the difference between the numerator and the denominator in the first
ratio above as TB = CA − NT − FI).β22 is the share of international transfers
to that process, and β23 the contribution for consumption stabilizing of the fac-
tors income balance (that is supposed to be positive as well, as consumption of
households that benefit from incomes from their oversea assets do not depend
only on their domestic yields).9
Our problem however, at the regional level, in decomposing the variance
of GDPgr for EU regions, was besides (5) that even for (3) we were only able
to estimate the β1 parameters. All the information we had available was for
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (broadly, investment) for a maximum of 162
9 Bayoumi et al. (1999) proceeds to a direct measure of this mechanism looking at the dispersion of
the ratio GNP/GDP through seven of the largest EU countries. They also apply the same approach
– as a benchmark – to British regions, taking regional personal income as a proxy of GNP.
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EU regions over the period 1995–2000,10 and of course for the corresponding
regional GDP, only allowing for the β1 estimation. Our idea was then to con-
sider that if we produced evidence that β1 has a significantly lower value for
regions than in the cross-countries analysis, that may be seen as a signal of wider
trade imbalances for regions, if we make the assumption that there is in fact a
risk sharing process among regions belonging to a country, as there is within
some groups of countries. This hypothesis (that leads to β3 < 1) was assumed at
the regional level, after it had been statistically confirmed for OECDmembers,
and above all in a more clear way for EU15. In effect, if β3 < 1 for regions
similarly to countries, and we get a low value for β1, then by (3), we should
have at the regional level a higher value for β2 comparing with countries. This
would mean that the assumed interregional risk-sharing process is mainly per-
formed through the trade imbalance mechanism. This evidence is consistent
with our claim that trade imbalances should be more prevalent for regions than
for nations.
4 Some results
The results we obtained for OECD member countries11 are reproduced in
Table 1.12 The most prominent result is that, unlike our expectations, the esti-
mated values of β3 are not always less than unity, in a statistical significant way,
exceeding even that value in 3 out of the 8 years of our analysis.
This result may cast some doubt on the occurrence of the risk sharing phe-
nomenon itself at cross-country level. Nevertheless, if this kind of behavior does
not prevail among OECD countries, that is not because investment does not
play its expected role: the investment rate follows clearly a pro-cyclical path
(β1 > 0, significantly for most of the cases), which would have allowed a strong
consumption stabilization, if β2 < 0 had not arisen in a systematic way.
In fact, because β2 < 0, there is no evidence that OECD countries resort to
external savings to offset adverse and idiosyncratic shocks to GDP, in contrast
10 We based our study mainly on NUTS II regions’ data, extracted at 29/12/2004, from the Regio
database, through the site of the Eurostat (except for Portugal where more complete national sta-
tistics were available). Information for regional investment was not available for Spain and UK.
For Germany we used NUTS I instead of NUTS II. We excluded countries that are not split by
regions at NUTS II level.
11 The data we based these estimates were extracted from the site of the OECD at 30/12/2004. The
same data have been used for EU15 estimates as well.
12 As can easily be checked by adding up the βs in Table 1, Eq. (3) of the main text is not exactly
confirmed by these results. The reason for that outcome is that basic macroeconomic identity (1) is
not respected itself in the original data, which is to say in the OECD 1995 constant prices data we
dealt with. That happens because, inmodernNational Accounts systems, constant prices aggregates
are always, in a first step, estimated at the previous year prices, being the fixed year constant prices
values obtained after by a chain-linking process. This procedure, however, generates an unavoid-
able discrepancy, in what is known in National Accounts jargon by the “additivity problem”. For
further discussion of this procedure and of the relevance of the discrepancy, please see Office for
National Statistics UK (2002). Besides this problem, however, in the data we used (source OECD)
identity (1) is also infringed at current prices by some countries, namely in a relevant way by Turkey.
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Table 1 Decomposition of the cross-sectional variance of shocks onGDP growth rates, 1996–2003,
OECD Members
β1 β2 β3
1996 0.578b (2.005) −0.559 (−1.454) 1.053a (5.013)
1997 0.434a (3.889) −0.046 (−0.231) 0.611a (5.096)
1998 0.877a (2.111) −1.016 (−1.230) 1.045a (3.753)
1999 0.375b (1.577) −0.116 (−0.387) 0.665a (6.857)
2000 0.192 (1.028) −0.046 (−0.156) 0.844a (5.321)
2001 0.684a (2.121) −0.691 (−0.750) 1.032a (3.444)
2002 0.421b (1.768) −0.126 (−0.835) 0.636a (2.379)
2003 0.386b (1.717) −0.149 (−0.461) 0.677a (4.451)
In this table, as in the others ahead, t-ratios are given in parentheses. These statistics are based
on “heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrixes”, of the kind HC3, that following Long and
Ervin (2000) are preferable for small samples as ours. In spite of this cautionary procedure we
corrected for heteroscedasticity whenever we detected it (namely in Table 5 results)
aCoefficients different from zero significantly at 5%, and bThose that are significant at 10%
Table 2 Decomposition of the Cross-Sectional Variance of Shocks on GDP Growth Rates, 1996–
2003, EU15 countries
β1 β2 β3
1996 0.342a (2.266) 0.011 (0.045) 0.646a (2.873)
1997 0.284a (3.498) 0.299b (1.896) 0.532a (4.192)
1998 0.221a (4.425) 0.072 (0.506) 0.654a(11.155)
1999 −0.024 (−0.086) 0.406a (2.554) 0.571b (1.978)
2000 −0.133 (−0.911) 0.453a (3.843) 0.723b (1.936)
2001 −0.186 (−0.290) 0.388b(1.956) 0.774a (2.590)
2002 0.041 (0.157) 0.325 (1.004) 0.633b (2.083)
2003 0.469b(1.774) −0.186 (−0.717) 0.663a (5.021)
aCoefficients different from zero significantly at 5%
bThose that are significant at 10%
to our theoretical expectations. In fact, trade deficits seemed to widen when
economies boom and to narrow when growth slows, dominated very likely by
the behavior of imports, that very often correlate with the product cycle.
However, if we look at the EU15 instead of the OECDmembers, the picture
we obtain is quite different (Table 2). The most outstanding finding for EU15
is that there is now evidence that supports the risk sharing phenomenon: that
is β3 < 1 always. On the other hand, consistently, external savings seem to play
its theoretical predicted role in stabilizing countries consumption shares, as we
estimated β2 > 0 for several years (although these estimates are often not sta-
tistically significant). Furthermore, investment does not follow the same strict
pro-cyclical behavior that we found forOECDcountries, as we nowobtain clear
lower values for β1 than we had before for OECD (β1 became even negative
for a few years, although non-significantly).
In our view, this combination of a mostly stable investment over the cycle
with a smooth consumption path may be a signal that EU15 countries can
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Table 3 Decomposition of β2 – OECD Members
β21 β22 β23
1996 −0.655 (−1.300) −0.037 (−0.706) −0.042 (−0.916)
1997 −0.227b (−1.815) −0.024 (−1.631) 0.158 (1.006)
1998 −1.387b (−1.789) 0.061 (0.929) 0.012 (0.069)
1999 −0.634a (−2.337) 0.052a (2.261) 0.174 (0.634)
2000 −0.675b (−1.701) 0.009 (0.269) −0.067 (−0.640)
2001 −0.270 (−0.890) 0.098a (2.196) 0.092 (0.402)
2002 −0.465a (−2.196) 0.027 (0.684) 0.131 (0.681)
2003 0.035 (0.070) −0.069 (−1.082) −0.028 (−0.486)
Except Hungary, Turkey and Luxemburg. Japan, Mexico, Poland and Switzerland are excluded as
well in 2003
aCoefficients different from zero significantly at 5%
bThose that are significant at 10%
already benefit, almost “like regions,” of an unrestricted access to external
savings, turning sometimes into relevant external imbalances by country stan-
dards (Portugal, Greece, Spain). In fact, it is quite plain from Table 2 how
different are the results between EU15 in comparison with the OECD coun-
tries (all the more so since the OECD comprises the 15 EU countries out of its
30 members).
At the country level, it still is interesting, before proceeding to the cross-
regional analysis through the EU, to look, even briefly, at Tables 3 and 4, that
have the purpose of decomposing β2 for OECD and EU15 member states, as
suggested by equations (4) and (5)13. The first relevant conclusion in this anal-
ysis concerns that we met β21 < 0 for OECD countries (Table 3), meaning that
the current account CA itself (and so the capital account in the conventional
sense) is the reasonwhy external savings do not promote risk sharing among this
group of countries. Indeed, our results suggest that international capital mar-
kets may have a perverse behavior, tightening the access to external savings
when countries do need it more, that is to say when growth slows and reces-
sion appears. The same kind of reaction by the capital markets may not arise
however among EU15 countries, according to Table 4, as β21 exhibits for this
latter group a more reduced value not significantly different from zero (though
still negative). If external savings have a role in the EU15, through the trade
13 Remark that as happened before with Eq. (3), Eq. (5) also comes to be infringed, as adding
up β21,β22 and β23 over the rows of Tables 3 and 4 does not match the corresponding estimates
to β2 at Tables 1 and 2. The reason now is that we could not proceed to this analysis at constant
prices, as we have not proper deflators for NT and FI, having we opted instead by using the current
prices of the dependent variables in the decomposition of β2. This procedure is justified because
we are computing growth rates of ratios, so working at current prices leads to exactly the same
results than deflating the numerator and the denominator by the same deflator. The reason for the
expressive discrepancy we met over (5) is that being the deflators of TB andC very unlike, it comes
that estimating β2 with nominal values is quite different from using constant prices on (TB+C)/C.
A second obvious reason for the mismatch in (5) is that in computation of Tables 3 and 4 results
we were not able of including all the countries we had used in Tables 1 and 2.
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Table 4 Decomposition of β2– EU15 Countries
β21 β22 β23
1996 −0.013 (−0.034) 0.057 (1.578) −0.063 (−0.551)
1997 −0.032 (−0.246) −0.016 (−0.302) 0.207a (2.212)
1998 −0.308 (−1.648) 0.010 (0.152) 0.317a (2.701)
1999 −0.037 (−0.380) 0.018 (1.003) 0.426 (0.596)
2000 −0.006 (−0.035) 0.013 (0.169) −0.028 (−0.099)
2001 −0.096 (−0.389) 0.108 (1.438) 0.355a (2.932)
2002 −0.365 (−1.628) −0.021 (−0.309) 0.392b (1.778)
2003 −0.285 (−1.288) −0.017 (−0.464) −0.073 (−0.446)
Except Luxemburg
aCoefficients different from zero significantly at 5%
bThose that are significant at 10%
Table 5 Share of the cross-sectional variance of the GDP growth absorbed by the investment rate
growth (β1) – EU Regions
β1
1996 −0.067 (−0.757)
1997 0.128a (1.925)
1998 0.121a (1.685)
1999 0.122 (1.461)
2000 −0.006 (−0.055)
2001 0.225 (1.210)
Except the Spain and UK regions
aCoefficients different from zero significantly at 10%
balances TB, contributing to a risk sharing process, that owes interestingly to the
stabilizer role of the factor income balance (β23) and not as might be expected
to the transfers operated through the European budget (reflected in β22).
As for the regional analysis within the EU, all we were able to do was esti-
mate β1 that stands for the investment impact on the smoothing consumption
process. In this procedure, we have excluded Aland, a Finnish archipelago that
accounts for only 26,000 inhabitants, and that acted as an outlier. On the other
hand, we used GLS instead of OLS (for correcting for heteroscedasticity), as
we had some evidence, in preliminary estimates, on different residual variance
by countries within our sample of regions.
Table 5 depicts our results that took into account in each year the whole set
of European regions which we are able to use. Note the low value to β1, smaller
than the one we estimated for countries, whether we dealt with OECD coun-
tries, or even in the EU15 case when these estimates were positive. It appears
that the absorption of a GDP disturbance that we assumed to exist within the
EU, at regional level, as among countries, should have been left to the external
savings mechanism (through TB imbalances) because empirical data suggest
that investment did not carry relevantly that burden.
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Table 6 Share of the cross-sectional variance of the GDP growth absorbed by the investment rate
growth (β1) for some European countries
Germany Belgium France Greece Netherl. Italy Poland
1996 −1.990a −0.588 0.191a −1.087 0.419 −0.226 –
(−2.878) (−1.797) (2.884) (−1.135) (1.327) (−0.712)
1997 −1.149 0.024 0.148 −0.242 0.990a −0.060 –
(−1.506) (0.047) (1.268) (−1.135) (2.343) (−0.378)
1998 1.626a −0.231 −0.439a −0.293 0.293 0.059 –
(2.648) (−0.603) (−3.099) (−0.371) (1.264) (0.278)
1999 −0.305 −0.160 −0.188 – −0.666a 0.378 −0.072
(−0.415) (−0.363) (−1.449) (−4.016) (1.199) (−0.363)
2000 0.941a −0.178 −0.141 – – −0.313 −0.178
(2.335) (−0.633) (−1.107) (−0.991) (−0.427)
2001 0.196 −0.479 – – – 0.505 –
(0.190) (−1.047) (1.583)
N 16 11 26 13 12 20 16
aCoefficients different from zero significantly at 5%
After obtaining β1 for the whole set of European regions, we further pro-
ceeded with the estimation of the same coefficient for each country separately
(although we confined our analysis to countries with at least ten regions). These
countries results, reported in Table 6, confirm that investment does not behave
at regional level in a way that induces consumption smoothing, so if that aim
is achieved, as we assume it is, it was the trade imbalance mechanism that was
compelled to play that role. We even obtained for the most of the time β1 < 0,
although estimates are not, very often, accurate enough (samples by countries
are too small) for ensuring that they are significantly different from zero.
At last, the available statistical information for EU regions (which confines
to investment rates) was able to provide yet other curious stylized fact. Indeed,
we found that, despite the fact that regional investment did not reproduce
the product cycle, it is notwithstanding a much more unstable variable at the
regional level than for countries. When we look at the 162 regions for which
data are available at our database, we concluded that in 116 cases we obtained
a higher standard deviation in the regional investment rate than in the country
where the region is located (if we had looked at the coefficient of variation
instead that number would had been 119). This result may mean that invest-
ment is exposed to an exogenous disturbance one that is not correlated with
production that should be more relevant for regions that at the country level.
If investment shocks do not spill into the regional GDPs and they do not dis-
turb consumption, as we assumed, then the only possible outcome is that they
are offset by the external trade, providing a further reason for enlarged trade
imbalances.
An interesting additional detail from this analysis is that among the 46 regions
where the investment rate is exceptionally more stable than in the correspond-
ing country, we find 21 out of the 26 French regions. France emerges then as a
peculiar case, with a more unstable investment rate for the country than for its
regions.
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Whenwe have inmind a cross-sectional standard deviation, instead of basing
our analysis on time series, we find again a larger disparity among European re-
gions than for countries. The cross-sectional standard deviation of the average
investment rate, between 1995 and 2001, for 162 European regions amounts to
0.0549, compared with 0.0250 for the EU15, 0.0352 for the OECD and 0.0361
for the 19 countries of the EU that are members of the OECD as well. When
we calculated however cross-sectional standard deviations within each EU
country, we met several cases with a reduced value for that indicator, even
below that recorded at EU15. France and Sweden deserve mention for having
regularly, in the course of time, cross-sectional standard deviations lagging be-
hind the corresponding statistics for EU15, that in average terms were 0.0178
and 0.0130, respectively. As a matter of fact, the general rule seems to be that
the regional disparity on investment rates moved in step with regional asym-
metries. For instance, Germany really urged on investing in its laggard regions
attaining a cross-sectional standard deviation of the average investment rate of
0.0998 over the period 1995–2001. These interregional disparities should have
lead to wide but welcomed trade deficits in those poorest regions.
5 Main conclusions
This paper brought forward a relatively wide set of empirical evidence sup-
porting the idea that EU regions meet more frequently trade imbalances of
relevant size than countries can stand. It would appear that regional (namely
interregional) exports and imports are beyond the scope of official statistics,
not allowing for a direct computation of trade imbalances. On the other hand,
as statistical information on domestic consumption and savings is also unavail-
able, on a regular basis, for European regions, we were unable to perform even
a more indirect assessment of regional external imbalances. With the purpose
of overcoming these limitations, we then settled on an approach that makes
the proof that investment (basically the information we have at regional level)
behaves consistently with our claim of wider trade imbalances for regions, rely-
ing on an assumption we deemed reasonable, namely that, at regional level,
economic agents do smooth consumption in a similar way shown in comparable
cross-countries analysis.
Of course, the idea that regions can incur in significant trade imbalances that
may be precluded at the country level was also discussed on theoretical grounds.
Our main argument was that the sustainability constraints, that limit countries
from running important external deficits, do not apply for regions or at least
they are not as pressing for them as they are for countries. As regions are free
of this sustainability jacket, they become capable of fully profiting from an effi-
ciency gain that, as we argued, may be provided through external imbalances.
In fact, although we cannot say a priori that regions must run trade deficits
rather than surpluses, or the opposite (not at least as deficits on some regions
have inevitably their counterpart as surpluses somewhere else), we argued that
efficiency is improved when capital flows from the regions where it is abundant
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(generating trade surpluses) to other regions where it is scarce (the less devel-
oped ones) causing deficits in these regions. On the other hand, if a region has
sound growth expectations, it may also be economically efficient to anticipate
consumption at the expense even of a trade deficit. Therefore, although we
concluded that regions run more frequently sizable deficits, we do not pretend
that they should worry with that fact (on the contrary they benefit with it very
often). External balance (or imbalance) shall not be a policy target for regional
policy, although it might be – if that information exists – a useful indicator of
the regional stance.
A related question to ourmain issue on the relevance of regional trade imbal-
ances is if countries that belong to a monetary union, such as the Euro-zone
countries, may to a certain extent be seen to be acting “like regions”, running
as well significant but also benign imbalances. This is of course a question with
very important policy implications in Europe, because it may lead to the crucial
conclusion, against the conventional wisdom, that the external deficits in Euro-
countries are innocuous, or at least are not as dangerous as they used to be.
As a matter of fact, the preliminary evidence we produced may support that
idea, as EU15 countries share the risk associated with idiosyncratic product
shocks in such a way that mimics regions’ behavior, and is thus distinct from the
OECD countries. In effect, they seem to bemore successful on the consumption
immunization process after the GDP specific disturbance, without resorting as
much to an investment compensating mechanism as would be the case for other
OECD countries. The avoidance of a sharp impact on both consumption and
investment can only be allowed by a wider access to external savings, at expense
of course of more pervasive trade imbalances.
However, we are very cautious about this last conclusion. The widespread
feeling of national policy authorities, all over the Europe, is that they should
continue to keep a close eye on the external position of their countries. On
the other hand it must be stressed that, in spite of the empirical evidence we
obtained, several theoretical arguments we put forward for regions, showing
that they are able to avoid the sustainability constraints, do not apply plainly
for Euro-countries. Nevertheless, being careful about radical conclusions for
the EU countries does not mean that we do not accept that in the future,
with greater integration, the importance of taming current external imbalances
will very likely lessen. Furthermore, if that happens, far from jeopardizing eco-
nomic growth and development, it will enhance economic efficiency throughout
Europe.
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